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Combating Terrorism with the Alien Terrorist
Removal Court
Jonathan H. Yu1

Introduction
The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”), the United States’ terrorism court, was
created in 1996 through congressional legislation.2 Although the statutes do not refer to the ATRC
by this name, the Court’s own rules do, and numerous authorities have used this name frequently.3
The legislation makes an alien deportation forum available where the government can safely use
classified evidence against suspected terrorists without exposing national security information.4
Congress structured the ATRC to balance national security needs with fundamental notions of due
process.5 By most measures, the ATRC’s statutory scheme is a legislative success. Even so, the ATRC
has never heard a case.6
Scholars link the ATRC’s nonuse to questions of constitutionality.7 This article does not
address the ATRC’s constitutional status, nor does this article speculate on why the ATRC remains
dormant. Instead, this article begins with the presumption that terrorist acts have occurred in the
last two decades, which justify U.S. counterterrorism efforts.8 Based on that presumption, this article
1 Jonathan H. Yu, J.D., Thomas Jefferson School of Law, LL.M., The George Washington University Law School, serves
as an Attorney Advisor with the Executive Officer for Immigration Review, United States Department of Justice.
The views expressed herein are presented in the author's personal capacity and are the author's alone and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Executive Office for Immigration Review or the United States Department of Justice.
Special thank you goes out to Tomiko Breland for her comments on an early draft of this article. I also want to commend
Vincent Ferraro and his team at the National Security Law Brief for their hard work and professional attitude. It has been
a pleasure working with you all.
2 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2012).
3 See Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”) Rule 1 (2012).
4 See Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It and Lose It”: An Exploration of Unused Counterterrorism Laws and Implications for
Future Counterterrorism Policies, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 677, 682 (2012).
5 See id. at 681; see also Clarence E. Zachery, Jr., The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us or
Becoming the Enemy from Within?, 9 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 291, 291 (1995).
6 See Blum, supra note 3, at 703.
7 Blum, supra note 3, at 710 (“[T]he fact that many academics and lawmakers believe that [the ATRC’s] provisions
deprive aliens of fundamental due process protections may be one reason for its non-use. Other commentators have
recognized that regardless of whether the ATRC is unconstitutional, the perception of its unconstitutionality has
resulted in its non-use . . . . ‘[I]t may be that constitutional doubts about . . . special court are why the government has
never used it.’ One scholar goes so far as to suggest that the Attorney General’s failure to invoke the ATRC might
indicate an effort to avoid an adverse constitutional ruling.”).
8 E.g., FBI 100, First Strike: Global Terror America, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.
fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608 (explaining that on February 26, 1993, Middle Eastern
terrorists exploded a bomb at the World Trade Center in New York. Six people were killed. More than a thousand
people were hurt in some way, some badly, with crushed limbs); e.g., The War on Terrorism Remembering the Losses of
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explores how, with its current make-up, the ATRC is useful for counterterrorism. Furthermore, this
article examines the ATRC’s robust statutory framework and concludes that the Court provides the
government with powerful tools against terrorist suspects that are unavailable in any other domestic
forum. Moreover, due to unique challenges in terrorism prosecutions, scholars have posited separate
court with special rules should be created for prosecuting terrorist suspects.9 This article contends
that creating an entirely new court for prosecuting terrorists is unnecessary because the ATRC is
available to take on that role.
Part I of this article gives an overview of the circumstances leading to the ATRC’s
creation and parses through its statutory framework.10 Part II explores the ATRC’s usefulness as
a counterterrorism tool.11 Part III discusses difficulties that occur during terrorism prosecutions
in criminal courts and explains how the ATRC framework solves those problems.12 Finally, Part
IV proposes necessary changes to the ATRC’s statutory framework to transform the ATRC into a
comprehensive terrorist prosecution forum.13
I. Background
A. Origins of the ATRC
The ATRC was born out of frustration during the Reagan Administration (hereinafter
KENBOM/TANBOM, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Aug. 6, 2003), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/august/
kenbom_080603 (noting that on August 7, 1998, nearly simultaneous bombs detonated in front of the American
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Two hundred and twenty-four people died in the blasts,
including twelve Americans. More than 4,500 people were wounded.); e.g., Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam, Fed. Bureau
of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/millennium-plot-ahmed-ressam (last visited
Apr. 15, 2015) (saying that on December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a 34-year-old Algerian, was arrested at Port Angeles,
Washington attempting to enter the United States with components used to manufacture improvised explosive devices.
He subsequently admitted that he planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the Millennium
2000 celebrations.); e.g., The USS Cole Bombing, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/
famous-cases/uss-cole (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (stating that on October 12, 2000, suicide terrorists exploded a small
boat alongside the USS Cole, a Navy Destroyer, as it was refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden. The blast ripped a
40-foot-wide hole near the waterline of the Cole, killing seventeen American sailors and injuring many more.); e.g., 9/11
Investigation (PENTTBOM), Fed. Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/9-11investigation (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (mentioning that on September 11, 2001, hijackers took control of four airliners
and crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania. They
were the most lethal terrorist attacks in history, taking the lives of 3,000 Americans and international citizens).
9 See generally Ashley Inderfurth & Wayne Massey, Trying Terrorists in Article III Courts, Challenges and Lessons Learned,
A.B.A. Standing Committee on L. and National Security, July 2009, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/trying_terrorists_artIII_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 505, 508-16 (2009) (discussing various national
security court proposals); see also Mark R. Shulman, National Security Courts: Star Chamber or Specialized Justice?, 15 ILSA J.
Int’l & Comp. L. 533, 543 (2009) (noting that “[t]hese proposals suggest that such a system offers benefits in expediency
and efficiency and enhanced security for the trial and for its participants and the community in which it is held. They
also say that national security courts offer a sensible way of managing the high stakes of releasing someone who should
not have been.”).
10 See infra Part I.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part VI.
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“Administration”), and took a decade to create.14 In 1987, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
sought to deport a group of Palestinians, known as the L.A. Eight, for terrorism activities on
behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”).15 The government possessed
classified evidence implicating the group in an international terrorist conspiracy that involved
raising funds and distributing literature on behalf of the PFLP.16 The DOJ had difficulty with the
deportation proceedings because at that time, if the government wanted to use classified evidence
as the basis for an alien’s deportation, the DOJ was then required to share that information with the
alien.17 Turning over classified information to the L.A. Eight was an untenable prospect: it meant
potentially revealing tightly guarded national security sources and methods to likely terrorists.18
The notion of deporting the L.A. Eight forced the government to make a difficult decision.
On the one hand, the DOJ could pursue the group’s removal and be forced to turn over classified
information in the process.19 On the other hand, the DOJ might risk the security of the country if it
chose to protect the classified information by dismissing the charges, allowing suspected terrorists to
remain unmonitored in the country.20
The Administration realized the choice was unpalatable,21 and responded by proposing
legislation Professor Stephanie Blum dubbed “a balance between . . . protect[ing] classified
information and the suspect[s’] . . . ability to defend against the accusations.”22 In 1988, the
Administration penned the ATRC’s predecessor,23 the Terrorist Alien Removal Act.24 Despite dying
without hearings in the Senate,25 the legislation was given new life seven years later.26
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and murders of two Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”) employees outside CIA headquarters focused national attention on domestic terrorism,27
rallying support for the legislation.28 Senator Joseph Biden headed the push.29 He rebranded the
Terrorist Alien Removal Act as the Alien Terrorism Removal Procedures (“ATRP”), and introduced
14 Blum, supra note 3, at 680-81.
15 Id.
16 Id.; see 22 U.S.C. § 2378b (2006) (limiting assistance to Hamas controlled Palestinian authority only during a period
for which a certification is in effect for terrorism ties).
17 Blum, supra note 3, at 680-81.
18 See 141 Cong. Rec. S14,524 (1995) (statement of Senator Orin Hatch) (“[The] success of our counter-terrorism
efforts depends on the effective use of classified information used to infiltrate foreign terrorist groups. We cannot afford
to turn over these secrets in open court, jeopardizing both the future success of these programs and the lives of those
who carry them out.”); see also International Terrorism: Threats and Responses: Hearing on H.R. 1710 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1995) (statement of William O. Studeman) (“Foreign governments simply will not confide in us
if we cannot keep their secrets. One goal of [the Terrorism Bill] is to provide a mechanism to do just that by protecting
classified information in special removal hearings for alien terrorists.”).
19 See John Dorsett Niles, Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 57 Duke L.J. 1833, 1835
(2008).
20 Id.
21 Blum, supra note 3, at 681.
22 See id.; see Niles, supra note 18, at 1835-36.
23 See Blum, supra note 3, at 681; see Zachery, supra note 4, at 292.
24 See 139 Cong. Rec. S15,249-01 (1993); see 140 Cong. Rec. S14,534-02 (1994); see 141 Cong. Rec. S1,454-01 (1995).
25 See Zachery, supra note 4, at 292.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 291.
28 See Blum, supra note 3, at 678-89.
29 See The Administration: Vice-President Joe Biden, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/vicepresident-biden (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
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ATRP to Congress under the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995.30
With national sentiment on their side, the government pushed the ATRP quickly through
Congress.31 The Alien Terrorist Removal Court thus materialized in 1996.32 As of that year, upon
a judge’s finding that “the continued presence of the alien . . . would likely cause serious and
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person,”33 the
United States is authorized to seek an alien’s deportation using confidential evidence without risk of
revealing national security information to the suspected terrorist.34 Certainly, if the ATRC statutory
framework was available in 1987, the DOJ would have successfully deported the L.A. Eight without
revealing to them classified information.35
When Congress passed the ATRC statute, legislators were confident that the Court would
adjudicate important terrorism cases.36 In a House Report accompanying the ATRC legislation,
Congress proclaimed, “The removal of alien terrorists from the U.S., and the prevention of alien
terrorists from entering the U.S. in the first place, [are] among the most intractable problems of
immigration enforcement.”37 To date, Congress’ ambitious legislation has yet to bear fruit. Professor
Blum framed the ATRC’s actual usage since 1996 succinctly:
“Despite the passionate rhetoric of its supporters and its apparent need
to confront a unique and intractable threat compromising national
security, the ATRC has never been used, even after the calamities on
September 11.”38
Therefore, the ATRC’s statutory scheme remains untested.
A. The ATRC and Its Statutory Framework
The ATRC sits five federal judges for five-year terms, with each appointed by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.39 One designee serves as the Chief Judge.40 The proceedings mirror
30 S. 390, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); H.R. 896, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
31 Blum, supra note 3, at 681; see Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation
Proceedings, 7 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, 25 (1996).
32 See ATRC, supra note 1 (noting the two pieces of legislation created the ATRC: The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”] of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
[“IIRIRA”] of 1996).
33 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (2012).
34 See Zachery, supra note 4, at 291.
35 See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 115 (2d Cir. 2008).
(holding that in a criminal case, the Classified Information Procedures Act [“CIPA”] “establishes rules for the
management of criminal cases involving classified information.”); see Blum, supra note 3, at 739 n.9 (comparing the use
of classified evidence under the CIPA).
36 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, 115 (1996).
37 Id.
38 See Blum, supra note 3, at 692 (internal quotations omitted).
39 See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(c) (2012); see generally, James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior Officers,
and the “Court of Law” Requirement, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1125 (2013) (discussing the constitutionality of such
appointments); see Alien Terrorist Removal Court Members Selected, U. St. Cts. (Sept. 1996), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/
TheThirdBranch/96-09-01/Alien_Terrorist_Removal_Court_Members_Selected.aspx; see 8 U.S.C. §1532(a)-(b) (2012)
(stating that judges can be designated, after their initial terms, subject to the staggering rule in subjection [b], and that
ATRC judges can contemporaneously serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court).
40 8 U.S.C. § 1532(c) (2012).
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the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).41 Congress gave the ATRC specific and
detailed authority, jurisdiction, and procedures germane to protecting national security and allowing
a terrorist suspect to present a defense.42
To help parse through the various authorities, procedures, and protections, this part divides
the statutory framework under four headings: (1) Initiating Proceedings, (2) Hearings and Evidence,
(3) Alien Protections Under the ATRC, and (4) Resolution of the Case.43
1. Initiating Proceedings
To commence proceedings in the ATRC, a DOJ Attorney prepares an ex parte application
containing a “probable cause statement” which is then filed under seal.44 The statement must
establish that: (1) the alien is an alien, (2) is physically present in the U.S., and (3) removal under the
usual process would pose a risk to the national security of the U.S.45 A judge decides the merits of
the application and is allowed to consider “other information, including classified information,”46
ex parte and in camera. If the judge finds probable cause,47 he “shall issue an order granting the
application.”48 If the judge denies the application, a written statement of the reasons is required.49
In contrast, the Attorney General can dismiss the removal case without explanation or appeal any
application denial directly to the District of Columbia Circuit.50
2. Hearings and Evidence
After an application is approved, a hearing “must commence expeditiously.”51 With few
exceptions, the hearings are open to the public.52 Reasonable notice of the charges detailing the time
and place of the hearing must be given to the suspect.53 Unlike in immigration court, 54 an alien in an
ATRC removal proceeding is entitled to counsel at the government’s expense.55
Furthermore, the alien is entitled to [limited] discovery, and may introduce evidence at
the hearing, examine the evidence against him or her, and/or cross-examine any witness(es).56
41 Id. § 1532(d).
42 See Zachery, supra note 4, at 315 n. 155.
43 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1534 (2012).
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2), (a)(1)(A)-(D) (stating that the application has four requirements: [1] the name of the
applying DOJ attorney, [2] a certification by the Deputy or Attorney General seeking removal of an alien that classified
information shows is an alien terrorist, [3] the identity of the alien for whom removal authorization is sought, and [4] a
statement of facts and circumstances to establish probable cause).
45 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(i)-(iii).
46 Id. § 1533(c)(1)(A).
47 See id. § 1533(c)(2) (stating that the judge must find the alien was correctly identified, is an alien terrorist present in
the U.S., and removal under traditional proceedings would pose a risk to the national security).
48 Id.
49 See id. § 1533(c)(3) (stating that the judge may not disclose any classified information in the written denial).
50 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b), 1535(a) (2012).
51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1) (2012).
52 See id. § 1534(a)(2).
53 See id. § 1534(b).
54 See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the person concerned
shall have the privilege of being represented [at no expense to the Government] by such counsel, authorized to practice in
such proceedings, as he shall choose.”) (emphasis added).
55 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2012).
56 See id. § 1534(c)(2)-(3), (e).
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The government has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alien is a
terrorist subject to removal.57 The Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable.58 The Court may issue
subpoenas for either party, but the alien cannot use that power to access classified information.59
In contrast to immigration court, an alien’s protections are subject to three limitations. First,
the government can use the fruit of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) authorized
surveillance and searches against the alien, but the alien is not permitted to access such fruit.”60
Second, the alien is prohibited from seeking to suppress evidence on the basis that it was unlawfully
obtained.61 Third, the alien cannot learn the source of any evidence if the government determines
the following: (1) public disclosure would pose a risk to the national security, (2) the act would
disclose classified information, or (3) revealing the source would otherwise threaten the integrity
of a pending investigation.”62 In practice, these rules would likely prevent a suspect alien terrorist
access to any government surveillance or informant-based information.
3. Alien Protections Under the ATRC
Although an alien’s access to classified evidence is limited, s/he is entitled to an unclassified
summary of classified information the government seeks to use against him or her.63 The summary
process is unique and meticulous. The government submits the classified evidence ex parte for in
camera review by the judge.64 Concurrently, the government tenders an unclassified summary.65 The
judge has fifteen days to rule whether the summary is “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare
a defense.”66 If the judge disproves the summary, the government has fifteen days to revise and
resubmit or seek interlocutory appeal.67
Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) aliens get additional protection.68 First, the judge “shall
provide for the designation of a panel of attorneys.”69 Second, the judge is required to assign a panel
attorney to review all classified information in camera on behalf of the LPR, and that attorney can
57 See id. § 1534(g).
58 See id. § 1534(h).
59 See id. § 1534(e)(1)(D).
60 See id. § 1534(e)(1)(A) (stating that the alien cannot access information “otherwise collected for national security
purposes”); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat.
2436 (hereinafter “FISA”) (implying that the government can use FISA authorized wiretaps and other data interception
to build a case against a suspect alien terrorist, and the alien does not have a right to that evidence).
61 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(B); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3504.
62 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(C).
63 See id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
64 See id. § 1534(e)(3)(A).
65 See id. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (stating that the unclassified summary must not pose a risk to national security).
66 See id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
67 See id. § 1534(e)(3)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (2012) (stating that interlocutory appeal is made to the District
of Columbia Circuit, and the ATRC judge is the gatekeeper of classified summary, congruently holding the key to the
alien’s ability to prepare a defense).
68 See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis,
2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 108 (2001) (concluding that it is appropriate for the due process claims of lawful permanent
residents to rank higher than those of noncitizens even if they subjectively think of the United States as home); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 694 (2001) (recognizing that the nature of due process protection may vary depending
upon an alien’s status and circumstance).
69 See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(e) (stating that the panel attorneys are required to have security clearance that allows access to
the classified information, i.e., Congress intended the ATRC be an adversarial proceeding).
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challenge the veracity of that classified information.70 Finally, automatic appeal is available if the
government used classified evidence without providing a summary.71
4. Resolution of the Case (Hearing, Decision, and Appeals)
After introducing evidence at the hearing, each party has an opportunity to present
its arguments “whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the removal of the alien.”72 Like in
immigration court, the government presents its case in chief first.73 The alien has an opportunity to
reply, and then the government may rebut.74 The judge has discretion to hear any part of arguments
pertaining to classified evidence in camera.75 If the government meets its burden, the judge “shall
order the alien removed and detained pending removal from the U.S.”76
Another departure from immigration court is that all decisions must be in writing and
contain “a statement of facts found and conclusions of law.”77 Any part of the written decision that
could reveal the “substance or source” of classified information “shall not” be made public or “made
available to the alien.”78
Finally, although an immigration judge can consider various applications for relief from
removal during removal proceedings, an ATRC judge may not consider “ancillary relief.”79 After a
removal decision is made, any party can seek appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, and after
the Circuit, may petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court.80
The next part of this article explores using the ATRC as a tool in combating terrorism.
70 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(i) (2012) (stating that any challenge to the classified evidence is done in camera
proceeding); see id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii) (stating that if the special attorney discloses any classified information to the alien
or to any other attorney representing the alien, the special attorney will be subject to a fine, or minimum prison sentence
of ten years, or both).
71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(2) (2012).
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(f) (2012).
73 Id. (adding that the alien generally concedes removability in immigration court, and the burden is shifted to the
alien to establish eligibility for relief).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 8 U.S.C. § 1534(i).
77 Id. § 1534(j).
78 Id. (emphasis added).
79 An immigration judge’s ability to consider ancillary relief is likely a major reason the ATRC has not been utilized.
An immigration judge may only receive classified information from the government which is not revealed to the alien
when it is considering the forms of “ancillary relief ” listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k). If an alien seeks discretionary relief,
the government can introduce classified evidence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a) (2012). Otherwise, aliens subject to
deportation have no right to classified information in immigration court. Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024,
1036 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739
(7th Cir. 2007). However, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012), classified evidence
is admissible against deportable aliens seeking discretionary relief without sharing that evidence with the alien. See D.
Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence: Eliminating A New Hardship of U.S. Immigration Policy, 19 Buff. Pub. Int.
L.J. 25, 40 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(4)(B) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. 1240.11(a)(3) (2014). The alien applying for discretionary
relief will concede deportability. Then the case becomes about whether notwithstanding being removable, the alien
warrants relief from removal to remain in the country. See generally, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2014) (listing various forms for
relief from removal). Thus, if an alien hopes to stay in the country based on ancillary relief, the alien rolls the dice on
classified evidence submitted by the government opposing relief.
80 See 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1), (d) (2012).
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II. The ATRC as a Counterterrorism Tool
The ATRC statutory framework is an effective counterterrorism tool because the scheme
allows the government to swiftly remove a suspected terrorist from the country or detain a
suspected terrorist on immigration charges before he or she can cause harm.81 Since 9/11,
the United States is committed to foiling domestic terrorist attacks and protecting the nation’s
security.82 In the spirit of that commitment, the government should consider using the ATRC as a
counterterrorism weapon in the “War on Terror.”83 Particularly in situations where criminal grounds
for detention are unavailable, the ATRC gives the government the ability to remove a national
security threat from within U.S. borders or detain a suspect on an immigration violation pending
removal.84
The government has acknowledged its willingness to use the “Capone approach,”85 which
involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses,
e.g., immigration violations.86 The following discussion demonstrates that using the ATRC’s statutory
framework under the Capone approach is superior to using the immigration courts to deport terror
suspects.
A. The ATRC Removes Terrorists Efficiently

The ATRC’s strength is in its simplicity. Adjudication in the ATRC is swift and the ATRC’s
statutory scheme keeps suspected terrorists off the streets pending removal.87 By comparison,
immigration courts are backlogged and adjudicate a variety of issues throughout a removal case that
would delay a terrorist’s removal.88
Removing an alien through immigration court can be a slow process.89 An immigration
court’s jurisdiction begins when an alien is issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”).90 The NTA contains
the date and time of a master calendar hearing and the allegations against the alien.91 At the master
calendar hearing, the alien pleads to the allegations in the NTA and can apply for various forms of
81 Id.
82 See Zachery, supra note 4.
83 See Christina Parajon Skinner, Punishing Crimes of Terror in Article III Courts, 31 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 309, 387 (2013)
(discussing the term “War on Terror”).
84 See id.
85 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Cong. Research Serv., R41780, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism
Investigations 18-20 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Notably, the ATRC is capable of relieving some of the immigration court backlog as well. The ATRC was
intended to handle a small volume of terrorism and national security immigration cases. See Andrew Becker, Terrorism
Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, Cal. Watch: Public Safety–Daily Report (Apr. 12, 2012), http://californiawatch.
org/dailyreport/terrorist-court-unused-16-years-after-creation-14746 (citing DOJ officials as indicating “the court was
intended to be low volume, as most suspected foreign terrorists can be removed without the use of classified evidence;”
in fact, the ATRC employs just five federal district judges—all of whom have full-time dockets). See id. (quoting Karen
Redmond, spokeswoman for the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, “[ATRC Judges] are not paid extra for being
on the court and carry regular caseloads in their respective districts.”). That means the ATRC has the capacity to handle
the low volume of national security and terrorism cases that work their way through the immigration courts each year.
However few, those cases still contribute to the backlog in the immigration court system.
89 See Becker, supra note 88.
90 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15 (2014).
91 Id.
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relief from removal and seek release on bond.92 The bond hearing is similar to criminal court bond
hearings and allows the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to determine if the alien can be released from
detention during the pendency of his or her removal hearing.93
Notably, with the current backlog of more than 400,000 cases,94 a case filed in some
immigration courts in 2014 will not be scheduled for a hearing until 2017.95 Therefore, if the alien
secures bond or is released on recognizance, s/he is free to move about the country for several years
before a removal order is issued.
In contrast, the ATRC jurisdiction begins with an ex parte application.96 If the ATRC
judge determines there is probable cause, the alien is taken into custody and adjudication begins
expeditiously.97 The ATRC has no backlog for calendaring a removal hearing, and suspects are
unable to apply for ancillary relief.98 Without ancillary relief, the removal proceeding addresses just
the merits of the alien’s removability.99 Although available in the ATRC, release pending removal is
not available to non-LPR suspects.100 Therefore, at least for non-LPRs terrorist suspects, the ATRC
prevents terrorist suspects from being released in the country pending removal.101
The ATRC’s appeals process is also more streamlined than that of immigration courts. In
immigration court, if a party wants to appeal a decision, the party must first appeal to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).102 After the BIA, a federal circuit court can review the BIA
decision.103 Only after the case survives scrutiny at those two levels may the parties seek review by
the Supreme Court.104 Considering the current backlog and three levels of prior review, a removal
case originating from an immigration court can take a decade to clear all the levels of review. If
bond is granted, a suspected terrorist is allowed to remain out of custody that entire time.
Appeal exhaustion with ATRC cases takes considerably less time.105 After the ATRC removal

92 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1003.47 (2014).
93 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2014) (noting also that terrorism allegations could prevent bond).
94 The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (“TRAC”) at Syracuse University keeps records detailing the
backlog in the U.S. Immigration Courts. TRAC also tracks various categories of cases that the immigration courts
presided over on year-to-year bases. Some of the number as of March 2015 include: 431,468 pending immigration cases;
594 days nationwide average wait time for a hearing; and 23,995 cases involving criminal violations, national security, or
terrorism. In fiscal year 2013, there were 192,736 deportation proceedings in immigration courts. Just fifty of those cases
had a nexus to national security or terrorism. The rest of the proceedings involved immigration issues. See also Immigration
Court Backlog Tool Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Courts, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
95 See Amy Taxin, Shutdown Delayed More Than 37,000 Immigration Court Dates By Months
Overburdened System Has No Slack For Rescheduling, The Columbian (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.columbian.com/
news/2014/feb/22/shutdown-delayed-immigration-court-dates-by-months (citing Hon. Dana Leigh Marks of San
Francisco’s immigration court as not having an opening on her calendar for merit hearings until June 2017).
96 See 8 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(2) (2012).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e) (2012).
100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(2) (2012).
101 Id.
102 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2014).
103 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(2) (2012) (“The petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the
judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.”).
104 See generally Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827 (2010).
105 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1) (2012).
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decision, there is no appeal to the BIA;106 instead, any appeal goes to the D.C. Circuit.107 From there,
the Supreme Court may be petitioned, and, even if the Supreme Court reviews the case, the Court
only has two lower court decisions with zero ancillary relief issues to look at.108 As such, an ATRC
case can exhaust all levels of appeal in less than one year.
In short, the ATRC statutory framework makes it possible to deport a suspected terrorist in
a short amount of time and keep suspected terrorists off the streets pending their removal.
The next section uses an actual terrorism plot to demonstrate the ATRC’s counterterrorism
utility.
B. The Mezer Case

To illustrate the ATRC counterterrorism prowess, consider the case of Ghazi Ibrahim Abu
Mezer (“Mezer”).109 Mezer and his cohort Lafi Khalil (“Khalil”) were arrested in their Brooklyn
apartment on July 31, 1997, for planning to bomb the New York City subway system.110 After
Mezer’s arrest, authorities learned Mezer and Khahlil were Palestinians, and were illegally present in
the U.S.111 Authorities also discovered Mezer was already in deportation proceedings in immigration
court, and was out on bond while the proceedings were pending.112
While out on bond, Mezer filed a political asylum application, i.e., ancillary relief, with
the immigration court.113 In the application, he claimed to fear persecution if returned to Israeli
authorities because they believed he was a member of the terrorist organization Hamas114 Mezer
submitted the asylum claim three months before his arrest,115 and managed to delay the asylum
hearing by moving for a change of venue to New York (the target city for his bombing plot).116
Based on these facts, all the requirements for ATRC jurisdiction were present. First,
Mezer was clearly an alien because he was placed in removal proceedings.117 Second, Mezer’s ties
to the terrorist organization Hamas establish the requisite national security justification.118 Third,
the government likely either had or could have reached out to Israeli counterparts for classified
information about Mezer.119 Therefore, the ATRC could have been invoked for Mezer’s deportation.
106 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1535 (2012).
107 This is an interesting prospect, because, currently, the D.C. Circuit does not review BIA decisions or have a body
of immigration case law. This is because the Arlington Immigration Court handles immigration cases that originated in
the District of Columbia, and the Arlington Immigration Court sits geographically in the Fourth Circuit. See § 1252(b)
(2).
108 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k)(1) (2012).
109 See Bombs in Brooklyn: How the Two Illegal Aliens Arrested for Plotting to Bomb the New York Subway Entered and Remained
in the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 1998), http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9803.
110 Id.
111 See id. (explaining that Mezer had been arrested three times in the previous thirteen months attempting to enter
the United States illegally from Canada–the first two times he returned voluntarily to Canada).
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 See id. (adding that Khalil was also in the United States illegally, having entered on a tourist visa but having
remained here after the visa expired).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See id. (describing several instances where the government failed to identify Mezer’s terrorist connections, but
those failures are beyond the scope of this article).
119 See generally id. (noting that the State Department normally does not perform specific checks on an individual’s
associations with terrorism absent a request to do so).
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Had the case originated in the ATRC, the government could have removed Mezer from the
country several months before his arrest date.120 The ATRC proceeding would have been fast and
efficient for several reasons. First, Mezer was not an LPR and was thus ineligible for bond while his
case was pending in the ATRC,121meaning that Mezer would have been detained from the time he
was placed in removal proceedings until he was ultimately deported.122 Second, his political asylum
claim is not an option in the ATRC.123 As such, Mezer could not delay his removal by forcing the
court to hold a merits hearing on an ancillary issue.124 Finally, Mezer could not have changed venues,
because there is only one ATRC court.125 Therefore, ATRC rules would have prevented Mezer from
both relocating to New York and carrying out his bombing plot.
Consistent with the Capone approach, if Mezer’s removal case had been brought in the
ATRC rather than the immigration court, the government would have prevented a planned subway
bombing.126 Moreover, the ATRC framework would have allowed the government to detain Mezer
for an indeterminate detention if no country was willing to accept him.127 Therefore, the ATRC’s
utility as a counterterrorism device is twofold: first, as a speedy and efficient process to remove alien
terrorists from the U.S., and second, as a means of detaining a suspected terrorist on an immigration
charge thereby preventing possible harm to the country and its citizens. Put simply, the government
should use the ATRC as a counterterrorism tool.128
The next part discusses the ATRC’s usefulness beyond being a counterterrorism tool.
III. Criminal Prosecution of Terrorists
Prosecuting terrorists is important for many reasons. Two reasons relevant to this discussion
are as follows: (1) under a system that respects the rule of law, crimes committed must be punished;
and (2) successful terrorist prosecution can prevent future terrorist acts and harms to U.S. nationals.
Nonetheless, the U.S. criminal justice system did not develop to prosecute terrorists; it developed to
prosecute crimes committed domestically.
Because the U.S. criminal justice system primarily prosecutes cases against its own
nationals, the U.S. system has developed rules and procedures that protect defendants based on the
Constitution. Some well-known protections include, but are not limited to, the following: the right
to confront witnesses, the exclusion of hearsay evidence and evidence obtained through coercion,
the right to self-representation, the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers, and the right to be
represented by an attorney.129 Moreover, defendants are entitled to discover any exculpatory evidence
in the government’s possession.130 Once a government witness testifies on direct examination,
statements or reports about the witness or prospective witness must be turned over to the
120 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k)(1) (2012).
121 See 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(A) (2012).
122 See, e.g., id. § 1534(i) (2012).
123 See id. § 1534(k).
124 See id.
125 See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012).
126 See Bjelopera, supra note 85 (remembering that, in this case, the government received a fortuitously timed tip that
enabled them to foil the subway-bombing plot).
127 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1537 (2012).
128 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k)(1) (2012).
129 See U.S. Const. amends. V-VI.
130 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) (requiring the government to
provide defendants with: [1] their oral statements; [2] written statements made by the defendant that are within the
government’s possession, custody, or control; [3] written records containing the substance of statements made by the
defendant; and [4] the defendant’s testimony before a grand jury).
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defendant.131
Notwithstanding the above, when it comes to terrorist prosecutions, legitimate and common
sense reasons counsel against employing these protections and procedure rules.132 The following
discussion identifies three areas of concern when prosecuting terrorist suspects in criminal courts
and points out how the ATRC statutory framework provides solutions for each concern: (A)
Classified Evidence, (B) Evidence Exclusionary Rule Concerns, and (C) Due Process Checks.
A. Classified Evidence
The L.A. Eight case highlights the fact that it is sometimes necessary to use classified
information in proceedings against terrorist suspects.133 Like pre-1996 deportation cases, the
government had to turn over classified information it intended to use during a criminal prosecution
to defendants.134 Defendants often tried to force that situation in a strategy colloquially called “grey
mail.”135 Congress tackled the grey mail problem by enacting the Classified Information Procedures
Act (“CIPA”).136 Importantly, CIPA does not prevent the discovery or use of classified information
in criminal cases.137 Rather, it was designed to allow the government to make an informed decision
about the effect a particular prosecution might have on national security before impanelling a
jury.138 CIPA only allows the government to ask the Court to permit substitutions, admissions, or
summaries of the classified information before the trial commences.139 If the Court denies the
government’s requests, the government can decide to proceed with the case to trial, which would
require turning over the classified information to the defendant; or dismiss certain charges, which
might mitigate amount of classified information disclosed; or dismiss the case without revealing
classified information.140
However, in the terrorism prosecution context, scholars agree that national security risk
131 See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (b) (2012) (imposing discovery obligations on the “United States” generally,
untethered to any one governmental entity. The Act requires information to be turned over to the defendant if there
has been a witness statement, if the United States possesses the statement and if the statement relates to the witness’s
testimony at trial).
132 See id.
133 See Henry Weinstein, Final Two L.A. 8 Defendants Cleared, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 2007, http://articles.latimes.
com/2007/nov/01/local/me-palestinian1.
134 See generally id.
135 See generally Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 11 n. 4 (defining “Grey mail” as a defense tactic usually available
to government employees connected to national security. When charged with a crime, the defendant claims classified
records are necessary for the defense. The goal is to request so many classified documents that the federal government
says “no.” Then, the defense tries to convince a judge that they cannot get a fair trial without these records. If the tactic
is successful, the case or charges are dismissed).
136 CIPA, Pub.L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006)).
137 See United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x
881, 887 (4th Cir. 2003) (“CIPA alone cannot justify the sealing of oral argument and pleadings.”); see also United States v.
Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[CIPA] creates no new rights of or limits on discovery.”).
138 See Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 437,
447 (2010) (explaining that, prior to CIPA, before admissibility was determined during the course of a public trial,
prosecutors had to predict: [1] what classified information the accused might seek to disclose, [2] whether the court
would rule it admissible, and [3] whether it would be leaked); see also CIPA § 5 (requiring defendants to notify the
government of any classified information the defendant “reasonably expects to disclose . . . in any manner in connection
with any trial or pretrial proceeding”).
139 CIPA § 6(c)(1).
140 See id.
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is higher than in domestic criminal violation cases, and the CIPA does not do enough to protect
classified evidence.141 Under the CIPA, terrorist suspects are still able to gain access to classified
intelligence through discovery or during trial testimony.142 Such access can expose sources of
intelligence and national security information to terrorist groups.143
In a piece published in the New York Times, Michael B. Mukasey demonstrated two instances
where classified intelligence was unintentionally revealed to terrorists during criminal prosecutions.
144
The first instance was the case of Omar Abdel Rahman for his role in the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing.145 In the Rahman case, the government turned over a list of unindicted coconspirators to the defendants.146 Osama Bin Laden was on the list, and within ten days, a copy of
the list reached Bin Laden.147 He thereby learned the United States was aware of his and his coconspirators’ connection to the World Trade Center bombing.148
The second instance was the case of Ramzi Yousef (hereinafter “Yousef case”), the socalled “mastermind” of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.149 During public testimony, a
witness’s comment about a cell phone battery somehow tipped off terrorists monitoring the trial
that one of their communication links was compromised.150 The terrorist group shut down that
phone immediately, which had in fact been under U.S. surveillance and provided valuable intelligence
in the past.151 The government lost that source of intelligence permanently, along with any
information that intelligence source may have revealed related to future attacks.152
These instances underscore conceivable risks to national security during a terrorist
prosecution. However, the ATRC framework provides solutions for these two situations. In the
Rahman case, the ATRC framework would have prevented him from discovering the list of coconspirators and subsequently leaking that list to Bin Laden.153 Under the ATRC, Rahman would
be allowed only to receive a summary of classified information without the specific names of each
alleged co-conspirator.154 As for the Yousef case, the ATRC statutory framework gives the judge
discretion to conduct witness testimony in camera.155 As such, Yousef and those monitoring the
courtroom would be unable to hear the comment about the cell phone battery.156
141 See, e.g., Radsan, supra note 138, at 451 (arguing that CIPA only offers a partial solution to the classified evidence
dilemma because it still requires the government to make a decision between prosecuting with some disclosure and
dismissing the case to avoid any more disclosure); see also Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 12.
142 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a).
143 See generally id.
144 Michael B. Mukasey, José Padilla Makes Bad Law, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB118773278963904523.
145 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that Abdel Rahman was a blind sheik who
led a conspiracy to perform jihad against the United States).
146 See Mukasey, supra note 144.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that in 1993, Yousef drove a van packed with
explosives into the basement of the World Trade Center, set a timer to detonate, and escaped before the bomb exploded.
He killed six people, injured over a thousand people, and cause more than $500 million in property damage).
150 See Mukasey, supra note 144.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 14 (recognizing that defendants counter classified evidence through a
special advocate who keeps the defendants appraised of the situation).
155 See Niles, supra note 18 (saying that judges have significant leeway when deciding what information to review).
156 See id. at 1841 (making clear that aliens are allowed access to non-sensitive evidence and witnesses, but that they
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Furthermore, under the ATRC’s LPR protections, Yousef ’s interest would have been
protected.157 The LPR protections require a suspect’s special attorney advocate to be present at in
camera hearings.158 That special attorney could contest the testimony on Yousef ’s behalf without
exposing that testimony to terrorists monitoring the case.159 Indeed, the special advocate protection
is akin to cross-examination—albeit by a surrogate.160 Professor Amos Guiora proposed a similar
solution in his article advancing proposals for a terrorist prosecution forum; he suggested, “[T]he
intelligence information would be presented in camera by the prosecutor and . . . would be subject to
rigorous cross-examination.”161 That is precisely what the ATRC framework provides.162
Therefore, had Rahman’s and Yousef ’s prosecutions occurred under the ATRC statutory
framework, national security information and an intelligence source would have been protected.
In other words, the ATRC statutory framework takes CIPA a step further because the scheme
prevents terrorist suspects from receiving any national security information whatsoever and prevents
disclosures of national security information during trial.163
A. Evidence Exclusionary Rule Concerns
In terrorism cases, sometimes the most reliable evidence available can be excluded from
trial based on evidentiary exclusion rules in criminal court.164 Evidence exclusion rules evolved to
protect defendants from coercion and other abusive conduct that potentially violate constitutionally
guaranteed rights by law enforcement.165 However, government or foreign personnel--that are clearly
not law enforcement--largely gather the evidence in terrorism cases.166
Indeed, intelligence gathering agencies or the military, which use fundamentally different
methods and have fundamentally different objectives than traditional law enforcement investigations,
usually obtain terrorist prosecution evidence.167 The goal of intelligence gathering is to collect
information in order to prevent future harms.168 In contrast, the goal of a criminal investigation are
to preserve evidence, to protect the integrity of information gathered, and ultimately to ensure a fair
are not afforded the same privilege with classified information).
157 See id. at 1840-41.
158 This proposition assumes that the Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) protections would apply to all defendants.
That consideration is discussed in more detail infra at Part IV(D).
159 See Niles, supra note 18, at 1840.
160 See generally id. at 1841 (acknowledging that an alien is allowed to cross-examine non-secret witnesses, and it
supports the inference that when the alien is unable to do so due to sensitivity issues, the alien’s authorized special
advocate will do so on the alien’s behalf).
161 Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing A Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 356, 361 (2008).
162 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 14 (noting that although the defendant is not allowed to directly
participate in the cross-examination when sensitive material is being discussed, the defendant’s special advocate will
advocate the defendant’s position as rigorously as possible).
163 Id.
164 See id. at 18 (stating that evidence gathering procedures in terrorism cases often do not comply with Federal
Criminal Evidence requirements, so the ATRC provides a statutory framework to rectify this shortcoming).
165 See generally id. (allowing the inference that normal evidence gathering procedures are rigorous in order to fully
protect a defendant’s constitutional rights).
166 See id. (stating that U.S. military personnel often conduct investigations on terrorism suspects).
167 See id. (highlighting the difference between purpose of collecting evidence by traditional law enforcement and
intelligence organizations, specifically that law enforcement attempts to be proactive while intelligence gathering is
usually reactive).
168 Id.
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trial based on the evidence.169 Therefore, inevitably, evidence gathered by intelligence forces against
terrorism suspects fails to satisfy rules developed to preserve the integrity of evidence for domestic
criminal prosecutions.170
Because there is little to no law enforcement involvement, it makes little sense to apply
exclusion rules designed to protect defendants against law enforcement coercion or abuse.
Admissibility of hearsay, statements given without Miranda warnings, 171 and chain of custody are
areas where discussants suggest court rules should be relaxed for terrorism cases.172
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, i.e., a verbal or nonverbal assertion, made by a
declarant, and offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.173 Hearsay is generally
inadmissible subject to exceptions because the evidence is deemed unreliable.174 Inadmissibility of
hearsay in terrorism trials is problematic for three reasons.
First, statements the government wants to use against terrorists are almost always hearsay.175
Specifically, the statements were obtained for intelligence purposes out of court, and there is no
applicable exception to admit them.176 Second, the information sometimes comes from foreign
intelligence sources unable or unwilling to testify at trial.177 Without the source’s testimony,
statements (or evidence of conduct—e.g., video surveillance or other recording) would fail to meet
the Crawford standard.178 Third, foreign evidence collection procedures often do not comply with U.S.
court standards, which makes it difficult to introduce statements obtained under those conditions.179
Despite the status of intelligence evidence as hearsay, that evidence should not be excluded
because it is the most reliable evidence available against a terrorism suspect.180 Yet, under traditional
exclusionary rules, the hearsay would be excluded in criminal courts.181
Miranda warnings are problematic for different reasons. During the course of an intelligence
gathering operation, terrorist suspects that are interviewed are not given Miranda warnings because
their statements are elicited to get intelligence.182 In contrast, when U.S. law enforcement questions
a criminal suspect, the suspect is given Miranda warnings before an interrogation because that
information is intended to be used for the suspect’s prosecution.183 The suspect can then invoke
169 See id. (reiterating that in criminal law there are highly detailed and particular methods that were developed in order
to protect the integrity of the evidence and ensure that it is admissible during trial).
170 See id. at 24 (stating that when intelligence agencies, both foreign and domestic, gather evidence, they often do not
comply with domestic court standards).
171 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
172 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 25-26 (paraphrasing an ABA panel discussion where discussants
suggested that Article III courts should admit all plausible evidence).
173 Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)-(c).
174 See id. at 802.
175 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 18 (noting that evidence collected by the intelligence community is often
hearsay).
176 See id. at 24 (discussing the recognized exceptions in terrorism cases for admitting normally inadmissible evidence,
and reminding the reader that the exceptions are finite).
177 See id.
178 See id.; see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
179 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 24.
180 See id. (supporting the idea that the primary reason for evidentiary exclusions with regard to hearsay is because it
is common and reliable).
181 See id.
182 See id. at 21 (arguing that even though intelligence gathering on the battlefield is not done for evidentiary
purposes, it may be useful to give those being questioned some form of Miranda warning in order to preserve the
integrity of the information being gathered).
183 See id. at 20 (stating that the United States requires the suspect be administered Miranda warnings if the evidence
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the right to remain silent or the right to an attorney, and the interrogation must cease.184 Of course,
Miranda can be waived.185
Most important, the purpose of the Miranda warning is to protect a suspect from law
enforcement coercion.186 That rationale does not hold water when a suspect is apprehended on
the battlefield or under exigent circumstances. It is pointless to warn a suspect of his or right to an
attorney or right to remain silent on the battlefield. Indeed, exigent circumstances may require the
suspect’s immediate interrogation to prevent imminent harm.187 Likewise, there is no way to predict
that a suspect is going to be tried in a U.S. court if found in a foreign country. In those situations, it
is impractical to pause and warn the suspect of his or her Miranda rights.188 Nevertheless, successful
Miranda challenges result in statements being suppressed.189
Another evidentiary hurdle with terrorist persecutions in criminal court is the chain of
custody required for admitting evidence during trial.190 The Federal Rules have specific requirements
to ensure the authenticity of evidence for use in prosecutions known as the “chain of evidence.”191
Scholars acknowledge when attempting to prosecute terrorists the burden of the chain of custody
are unfeasible and often impossible.192 Having a member of the military travel from the battlefield
to the Court in order to authenticate evidence or testify to the chain of evidence undermines
national security interests on the battlefield.193 One can also imagine a situation where an intelligence
source, like a terrorist cell phone, provides evidence that the government is unwilling to expose in
the process of authenticating the exhibit for trial. Nevertheless, just because the government does
not want to reveal the source of evidence does not mean the evidence itself is unreliable. Similarly,
just because a military service member cannot testify in court about the chain of custody of the
evidence does not mean the evidence is unreliable.
As indicated, evidentiary exclusion rules exist to protect the defendant from improper law
enforcement practices and prevent police abuses.194 The same logic falls short for situations where
evidence is gathered under the rules of war or for intelligence purposes, like preventing a future
attack.195 The military is not law enforcement.196 Yet, the military is often called upon to gather
evidence used to prosecute terrorist suspects.197 In short, the rationale for the hearsay, Miranda, and
gained through an interrogation is to be allowed at trial).
184 Id.
185 See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (recognizing that the burden to establish that a defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived the rights protected by Miranda rests on the state).
186 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 20.
187 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (acknowledging a public safety exception to the Miranda
requirement).
188 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 21(agreeing that Miranda warnings on the battlefield would be
impractical).
189 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985) (recognizing failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a
presumption of compulsion, which if not rebutted, means that the statements are excluded from evidence. Conversely,
if a suspect claims that statements were elicited by torture, it may be unfair to use the statements at trial).
190 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 25.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See id.
194 See id. at 20 (discussing how failure to administer Miranda warnings to terrorist suspects can preclude the
information from being allowed in court, thus helping the defendant).
195 See id. at 18.
196 See The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012) (prohibiting the use of the military for law enforcement
purposes).
197 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 18-19 (suggesting that due to the unique role of the military they often
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chain of custody exclusionary rules is not rational for evidence in terrorism prosecution cases.198
These rules hinder terrorism prosecutions.
The ATRC statutory framework provides a solution to the exclusion problems in terrorism
cases.199 All of the evidentiary rules for criminal prosecutions in federal court are contained in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.200 Therefore, to avoid evidentiary exclusions, one need only make the
Federal Rules of Evidence inapplicable in the terrorist prosecution forum.201 Instead, a judge should
determine whether the information is reliable enough to admit into evidence. This is in fact how
evidence submission takes place in the ATRC.202 The ATRC’s statutory framework explicitly states
that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.203 As such, issues of hearsay, Miranda warnings, and
chain of custody are irrelevant in proceedings before that ATRC.204 Therefore, if a terrorism case
were in the ATRC, hearsay, Miranda, and chain of evidence are all nonstarters.205 Put differently, the
ATRC statutory framework resolves exclusionary rule hurdles to prosecuting terrorist suspects in
domestic criminal courts.
B. Due Process Checks
One foundational element in implementing legislation pertains to fairness, despite any
emotional biases, because “[w]e know that even if logic dictates doing things one way, we need to
do it a different way in order to be what we want to be as a people.”206 In other words, a terrorist
prosecution forum must afford a suspect protection and rights so the proceedings are legitimate.
A terrorism prosecution forum cannot be one sided in favor of the government or else it will be
perceived as unfair. Therefore, an ideal terrorism prosecution forum will satisfy concepts of justice,
evenhandedness, and due process. Americans are uncomfortable with the possibility of detaining the
wrong person and are also uncomfortable with trial results that appear to lack integrity.207
To that end, the ATRC framework safeguards suspects in several ways. First, the ATRC
requires a high-ranking government official to certify that national security information is evidence
against a terrorist.208 Also, the ATRC guarantees an Article III judge will review classified evidence to
ensure that a defendant is able to put on a defense.209 In fact, a former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Andrew McCarthy, recommended using Article III judges as a way of maintaining fairness.210 He
encounter and collect evidence on terrorist suspects before law enforcement agencies get involved).
198 See id. at 19 (arguing that the goals for intelligence gathering operations are different than those for law
enforcement, and that the evidentiary rules should not be the same).
199 See generally id. (discussing the importance of the ATRC in creating ways around normal evidentiary standards).
200 See id. at 23.
201 See generally id. at 18-19 (arguing that as long as the Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable to military
intelligence gathering or terrorist prosecutions, the traditional evidentiary rules do not apply).
202 Id. at 28.
203 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (h).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Andrew C. McCarthy, A Case for a National Security Court, 57 Wayne L. Rev. 275 (2011).
207 See W. Dudley McCarter, Juror Nondisclosure, 55 J. Mo. B. 214, 216 (1999); see generally State v. Dett, 891 A.2d 1113
(2006).
208 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(c) (2012).
209 Indeed, Article III judges are key to a suspect’s protection in the ATRC. Article III judges are familiar with
criminal cases and are equipped to understand the type of information a defendant needs to make a defense. This is
particularly relevant to the classified evidence summaries because the judge determines whether the summary is adequate
to make a defense.
210 See McCarthy, supra note 206, at 279–80.
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hypothesized that allowing Article III judges to administer cases under rules that protect intelligence
information would sufficiently operate as an “independent judicial check” on the executive branch,
ensuring the proceedings are not a rubber stamp or sham. 211
In addition, ATRC proceedings foster public participation in the process by requiring
proceedings to be open to the public.212 This element provides transparency and keeps prosecutors
honest.213 Terrorist suspects also benefit from no cost advocacy and prior notice before an ATRC
proceeding commences.214 Therefore, like traditional criminal proceedings, a terrorist suspect tried in
the ATRC has the right to an attorney at no cost, is informed of the allegations against him, and has
an opportunity to present a defense.215
A terrorist suspect is even protected during in camera sessions.216 A suspect has an advocate
present to contest testimony or evidence on the suspect’s behalf during all in camera sessions.217
Importantly, although the terrorist suspect does not see any classified evidence, his or her advocate
does.218 Therefore, a suspect’s defense team does get all the evidence in its original form.219
Finally, a terrorist suspect has the additional protection and right to appellate review of
decisions at all stages of the proceeding.220 So, if the ATRC judge errs or the evidence is insufficient
to sustain the claims, the suspect can bring that argument before an appellate tribunal.221
In short, the ATRC statutory framework provides due process checks that legitimize terrorist
prosecution in that court. The framework is therefore ideal for resolving the struggles prosecutors
currently face when prosecuting terrorist suspects in criminal courts. However, the ATRC statutory
framework does have its limits.
The next part proposes changes to the ATRC’s statutory framework to make the ATRC a
forum capable of adjudicating terrorism cases.
IV. Transforming the ATRC
As enacted, the ATRC is an incomplete terrorism prosecution forum because it lacks
necessary authorities to adjudicate criminal proceedings.222 The ATRC is, after all, structured as an
alien deportation court.223 However, because Congress already equipped the ATRC for overseeing
terrorism cases and providing protections to terrorist suspects, only minor amendments are needed
to transform the ATRC into an effective prosecution forum. The following proposals will give
211 Id.
212 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (2012).
213 See generally Public Right of Access to Criminal Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1980).
214 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(b), (c) (2012).
215 See id. § 1534 (a)-(c).
216 See id. § 1534 (f).
217 See id. § 1534 (e)(3)(F).
218 See id. § 1534 (e)(3)(A).
219 See id. § 1534 (c).
220 At the application stage, the defendant can seek review by the D.C. Circuit if they are not provided a summary, and,
when the case is decided, that decision is subject to review by the D.C. Circuit. Ultimately, the Supreme Court may even
grant certiorari.
221 See 8 U.S.C § 1535 (c)(4)(D) (2012).
222 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2012) (allowing for certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in
the area of national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or the
Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation)
223 Emily C. Kendall, The Alien Terrorist Removal Court and Other National Security Measures You May Have Never Heard of:
The Need for Comprehensive National Security Reform, 18 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 253, 269 (2011).
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the ATRC necessary powers, authority, and jurisdiction to be a viable forum for both terrorism
prosecutions and terrorist removal.
A. Amend Certification Requirement
The ATRC’s application and certification process should be amended so the ATRC
jurisdiction can be invoked at the local and regional levels. Currently, the ATRC requires the
Attorney General to certify all ATRC removal proceeding applications.224 Although requiring
certification helps ensure the ATRC hears only the most serious national security cases, in practice
this certification is difficult for regional government entities to obtain.225
In 2008, Congress modified a similar certification provision in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, to give local and regional office level supervisors authority to certify applications
for the FISC.226 Such amendment is practical and necessary to make the ATRC function for
terrorism prosecution or removal.
Indeed, post-9/11 the ATRC application and certification process is more complicated for
two reasons. First, since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), as opposed to the
DOJ, is responsible for initiating deportation proceedings against aliens.227 Second, cross department
certification is impractical.228 Even assuming the authority to certify an ATRC application has passed
to the Secretary of DHS, which is not at all clear, it is inefficient for each satellite DHS office to ask
headquarters to certify each case.229 As such, the application and certification authority should be
amended to extend or delegate application certification ability to supervisors at local offices. Also,
it would be prudent for the amendment to clarify which agency is responsible for bringing cases
before the ATRC.
B. Expand the Court’s Jurisdiction
The ATRC’s jurisdiction needs to be expanded in order to adjudicate criminal cases.
Presently, the ATRC has jurisdiction over aliens when national security information is used or a
likelihood of severe harm is present.230 The ATRC has no personal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and
224 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
225 Leslie A. Holman, The Impact of September 11th on America’s Immigration Laws, Policy, and Procedures, 27-DEC Vt.
B.J. 17, 19 (2001) (noting that specifically, the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General (there is no power
of delegation) may certify an alien as a terrorist if reasonable grounds exist to believe the alien is a terrorist or has
committed a terrorist activity).
226 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2012) (allowing for certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in
the area of national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or the
Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
227 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 441, 116 Stat. 2192 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006))
(transferring the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“Service” or “INS”) to the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”), and retaining in the Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General
the functions of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)).
228 Id.
229 See About ICE: Office of Principle Legal Advisor, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2015) (explaining that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Office of the Principal Legal
Advisor (“OPLA”) is the exclusive legal representative for the U.S. government in exclusion, deportation, and removal
proceedings before the immigration courts. Moreover, OPLA attorneys also litigate immigration related hearings that
involve criminal aliens, terrorists, and human rights abusers).
230 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (e)(1)(c) (2012).
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the ATRC has no authority over violations of criminal statutes.231 The Court’s personal jurisdiction
is therefore inadequate for terrorism cases perpetrated by U.S. citizens. Even so, because it is
reasonable to adjudicate all terrorism cases in the same forum, the ATRC’s personal jurisdiction
should be amended to include all terrorist defendants regardless of immigration status.
Additionally, the ATRC needs additional subject matter jurisdiction to be able to hear
criminal terrorism cases. Existing ATRC authority limits subject matter jurisdiction to determining
whether an alien is a terrorist for purpose of deportation.232 However, terrorism prosecutions are
based on violations of federal criminal statutes.233 In this sense, the Court should be authorized to
adjudicate federal terrorism crimes.
Finally, the ATRC judges require additional disposition authority. Currently, the ATRC
judge’s only disposition authority is deportation.234 If the Court is to decide criminal matters, it must
be able to impose criminal sentences upon successful convictions. Therefore, the ATRC statutory
framework should be amended to allow ATRC judges to sentence convicted terrorists.
C. Two Standards of Proof
The ATRC should have different standards of proof depending of the subject matter of the
proceeding. In terrorist removal cases, the standard should remain at clear and convincing evidence. That
standard makes sense because deportation is not a punishment or deprivation of an alien’s liberty
interest.235 Likewise, in camera hearings regarding classified and national security information can
remain at the clear and convincing standard because such proceedings address only the admissibility
of evidence. However, the standard for criminal matters should be beyond a reasonable doubt to
comply with the Constitution. In all criminal proceedings, a defendant is presumed innocent.236
That presumption would make little sense without the higher standard of proof for criminal cases
because a defendant’s liberty is ultimately at stake.
D. Extend LPR Protections to All Defendants
The ATRC LPR protections are the most powerful protections available to a suspect
provided by ATRC statutory framework. However, those protections are unavailable for all
nonpermanent residents.237 Because liberty interests are at stake in a criminal case, ATRC LPR
protections should be extended to all defendants regardless of alien status.238 Doing so will assure
the highest level of due process available under the statute for criminal defendants tried in the
ATRC. Having a special advocate on the defense team who is able to view all the classified evidence
and contest that evidence balances out the minimization procedures the Court applies with respect
to classified evidence.239 Giving such protection to all defendants adds a level of legitimacy to the
proceedings.
231 See 8 U.S.C. § 1531 (1) (2012); see 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (a)(1) (2012).
232 See 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (a)(1) (2012).
233 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B) (2012).
234 See Blum, supra note 3, at 1.
235 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime . . . . It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the performance of which . . . his continuing to reside here shall depend.”).
236 See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895).
237 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 761 (2008) (holding that aliens detained at the U.S. Naval Station in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus).
238 See id. (suggesting that non-LPR aliens detained for terrorism prosecution should have constitutional protections).
239 See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 14.
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E. Hybrid Court
With the amendments recommended above, the ATRC can function as a hybrid court.
That is, the ATRC should be viable for seeking terrorist removal as well as terrorist prosecution.
Since Erie v. Tompkins, federal courts apply state law and federal procedural rules simultaneously
in the same court.240 Applying immigration law and criminal law in the same court is no different.
Moreover, the ATRC federal judges are familiar with balancing a dual docket (civil and criminal).241
Therefore, it should not be difficult for ATRC judges to manage both removal proceedings and
criminal terrorism cases.
Similar hybrid courts have been successful in the international context applying both
domestic penal law and international law.242 The successful hybrid legal applications indicate the
ATRC can do so as well. Moreover, if an alien is subject to removal and suspected of criminal
terrorism, it conserves judicial resources to resolve both issues in the same proceeding. No doubt,
many of the issues would overlap.
Finally, DHS and DOJ attorneys are equipped to handle criminal and immigration matters
when it involves an alien.243 Whichever agency represents the government in the ATRC,244 it should
have little difficulty managing dual dockets.245
F. Name Change
This article’s final proposal is to give the transformed ATRC a new name. “Alien Terrorist
Removal Court” does not encompass the hybrid jurisdiction of the herein proposed terrorism court.
The name “United States Homeland Security Court”246 could be one option. That name connotes
aspects of immigration and national security; practically speaking, immigration processing falls
under the purview of the DHS as they involve the security of the homeland.247 Another option is
simply “United States Terrorism Court,” a name that highlights the terrorism-centric aspect of the
Court. Whichever name, with the proposals above, the ATRC is a complete solution for prosecuting,
deporting, and detaining terrorist suspects.
Conclusion
It is a shame that the ATRC has sat unused for almost two decades.248 The ATRC’s powerful
statutory authority makes it a mighty weapon against terrorist suspects, and an ideal forum for
prosecuting terrorist suspects. Indeed, the ATRC’s statutory framework exemplifies a balance of
national security considerations with due process of law. The government should use the ATRC
to combat terrorism and to prosecute terrorist suspects. The latter use takes some statutory
240 See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
241 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012).
242 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 295, 295 (2003) (discussing hybrid
domestic-international courts and the blending of international and domestic laws in those courts).
243 See generally, 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
244 See id.
245 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (stating that DOJ attorneys also litigate in both immigration and criminal cases).
246 See Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 New Eng.
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 13 (2006) (proposing a “Homeland Security Court” using Article I judges to determine the
lawfulness of intelligence gathering, terrorist surveillance, and detention of prisoners of the Global War on Terror).
247 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 441, 116 Stat. 2192 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)).
248 See Andrew Becker, Terrorism Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, Cal. Watch (Apr. 12, 2012), http://
californiawatch.org/dailyreport/terrorist-court-unused-16-years-after-creation-14746.
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amendment, which is provided in this article.249 Nonetheless, activating the Court is prudent and
follows precedent.250 In 2002, the FISA Review Court heard its first case two decades after its
creation.251 Like the FISA Review Court, the ATRC’s twenty-year hibernation is up.

249 See supra Part IV.A.
250 Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J.) (calling the ATS a “kind of legal Lohengrin,” and pointing out that as of 1975, there were only two cases
ever brought under the ATS – the first case being in 1960); see Carolyn A. D’Amore, Note, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and
the Alien Tort Statute: How Wide Has the Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39 Akron L. Rev. 593, 600 (2006)
(noting that until 1980, only a handful of cases were brought under that statute); see also Major William E. Marcantel,
Jr., Human Rights Boon or Ticking Time Bomb: The Alien Tort Statute and the Need for Congressional Action, 217 Mil. L. Rev. 113,
119 (2013) (detailing that after 1980, ATS suits became increasingly more frequent); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 461, 461 (1989) (noting that the ATS was
originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
251 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting that this case was the first appeal
to the Court of Review since the passage of FISA in 1978).

